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Abstract In this article, I narrate an ethnographic storyline that involves forest inhabitants,
local politicians, development professionals, and scientific researchers in both representa-
tional and nonrepresentational worlds of knowing. I discuss how and why, in Angola, mak-
ing forest knowledge through relations of distance to the forests is crucial for attaining
institutional legitimacy over the forests. This way of acquiring authority and influence is
championed by a broad epistemological tendency to address only the absent, which is then
made present by accredited representers. Yet this technique disempowers local forest dwell-
ers in their everyday territories and disallows the capacity that the ecological knowns have
to reveal themselves. Knowing Angolan forests through absence and distance is not just a
potent contemporary form of knowledge that qualifies as a way of ruling the forests, but is
also integral to widespread (neo)colonial processes of distinction and separation: the
knower and the known, the representer and the represented, the “cosmopolitan intellec-
tual” and the “rustic bestial” Other. Finally, I discuss different forms of ecological knowledge
in light of ethical stances toward knowing, relationality, and, ultimately, being.
Keywords forests, nonrepresentational, partly representable knowledge, ecological knowledge,
epistemologies, Angola, Africa
“W e need reliable information on forests.” This plea traveled the world in a brochuremade by a major agency of the United Nations.1 A few years later, in 2012, NASA
revealed the most accurate map ever produced of the United States’s forests. One lead-
ing researcher in the project explained the reasons for its production: “Forests are a key
element for human activity. We have to know [them properly].”2 By 2014, the European
Economic and Social Committee published a final document on “EU forest strat-
egy” that states, “improved knowledge base is the key to understanding [the forests].”3
1. FAO brochure, “Seeing the forest . . . ”
2. Josef Kellndorfer, quoted in Boyle, “Land of the tree.”
3. European Economic and Social Committee, “Opinion of the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee,” 128.
Environmental Humanities 10:2 (November 2018)
DOI 10.1215/22011919-7156805 © 2018 João Afonso Baptista
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons license (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0).
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/environmental-humanities/article-pdf/10/2/397/555852/397baptista.pdf
by joao.afonso.baptista@gmail.com
on 05 December 2018
Declarations of the vital relevance of knowledge about forests have proliferated among
institutions on almost all continents. All arise in the midst of a larger concern: in order
to maintain conditions conducive to life, we have to understand the biosphere and its
components properly.
But how to do so?
In December 2014 I met with Mateus Côxi,4 a middle-aged university professor and
NGO consultant in forest management who works from the Angolan city of Huambo.
During our two-hour conversation he used geospatial images, graphs, and satellite
maps to support his knowledge of a forest located in Gove, about one hundred kilome-
ters from Huambo. Mateus was in the process of finishing a commissioned report on
forest land in that area. At one point, I asked him for photos from the forest. “I don’t
have [any],” he said, “because I was never there.” He then continued: “The peasants liv-
ing there cannot use the forest as theirs. Forests are a delicate matter.” Alluding to the
quality and usefulness of his work, Mateus concluded, “They have to be dealt with by
experts who know them properly.” He made it clear that he considered accurate forest
knowledge to be possible when the knower is at some distance from the forest itself.
Farther south, as we strolled through a dry bushy area, I asked Gabriel Augusto, a
23-year-old resident in the village of Cusseque, about his knowledge of the forest we
were in. He told me: “Feel the sound in the soles of your feet and you learn about this
forest.” Later, Felicia Zambica, another resident in the village, joined us. “The rain doesn’t
rain as it used to,” she said. “The forest is transforming.” Seeing my questioning facial
expression, she grabbed what seemed to be a small, solid rock from the ground and
told me to cup my hands and put them below hers. Then, while gently crumbling the
“rock” and letting the brown dust fall into my hands, she asked, “Do you feel it?” I felt
an inexpressible sensation through my fingers, as if my knowledge of the forest soil
had increased in significance through “hereness” and tactility.
The statements and actions of Felicia, Gabriel, and Mateus inspire an important
discussion about the nature of ecological knowledge. This is far from straightforward,
and it has permeated much of the debate on “environmental truth” and governance.5
Yet, in most academic, political, and development circles, there is an element that ap-
pears practically uncontested in these discussions: as Bruno Latour puts it, there is “no
reality without representation.”6 At the core of his work, Latour deconstructs reality and
its making through (scientific) knowledge activity by focusing on the material and social
processes behind the fabrication of representations.7 Latour, like many other scholars,
posits that representations are not just passive signals helping us to communicate
4. All names are pseudonyms.
5. For example, see Agrawal, Environmentality; Berkes, Sacred Ecology; Goldman and Turner, “Introduc-
tion”; and Fairhead and Leach, Science, Society, and Power.
6. Latour, Politics of Nature, 127.
7. Latour, “Drawing Things Together”; Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life.
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about things. Rather, they are interventional “figures of knowledge” that produce reali-
ties and thus engender “the order of things.”8
One of the most compelling arguments to explain the dominion of representa-
tions, specifically in forest knowledge, is that there is a need to create and use intermedi-
aries to refer to actual phenomena “that [are] too large, distant or subtle to be physically
brought into the room.”9 As Hanna Pitkin explains, the word representation derives from
the Latin repraesentare, “to make present” what is not.10 In this context, representations
can be utilized for their potential to liberate humans from interacting directly with the
matters at stake in order to know (or claim to know) them. To put it another way, by al-
lowing knowledge to be produced, distributed, and claimed in the absence of the actual
referents, representations can serve to support the physical alienation of the knower
from the objects of his or her knowledge. Yet representations are relational. They con-
nect the knower with the known in various ways and can bring the knower closer to
the known regardless of the physical distance between them. At the heart of the mat-
ter, representing and representations are a form of relating.
In this article, my aim is to explore the relationalities of knowing, in particular
(though not exclusively) in relation to the forests in Angola. Influenced by Emmanuel
Levinas’s hermeneutics of lived experience, I investigate the ethical reasoning underly-
ing a largely implicit belief in the field of ecology: that in order to achieve legitimacy,
knowledge has to represent. Coming in the wake of a tradition of poststructuralism, Mi-
chael Dillon posits that what we make of the world—how and what we know about the
world—is the product of the way we relate with it.11 Following this reasoning, and in
agreement with Jarret Zigon’s argument that ethics are to be conceived in terms of the
character of relationships,12 what could we say about the ethics of knowledge and the
legitimacy of governance of forests gained and exercised mostly through relationships
of physical distance from them? Gail Weiss reaffirms the relevance of this question
when she argues, “It is in and through our bodies that we feel the effects of our moral
judgements and practices.”13 Having this in mind, a final, guiding query emerges: what
makes the promotion of representational knowledge and distance so decisive in ecology?
Based on ethnographic research on forms of ecological knowledge in Southeast
Angola between 2011 and 2014, I demonstrate that representations of ecological knowns
generated through relationships of sensorial disconnection with them do not gain cur-
rency and power because of their claims to accuracy as affirmed by many scientists,
development professionals, politicians, and environmental activists worldwide. Rather,
such representations are valued because they open up the possibility for linking with
8. Foucault, The Order of Things.
9. Rajão, “Representations and Discourses,” 21.
10. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 214.
11. Dillon, “Poststructuralism, Complexity, and Poetics,” 4.
12. Zigon, “Attunement and Fidelity,” 21.
13. Weiss, Body Images, 141.
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the represented at a distance; and in doing so they allow authority to be claimed and
exercised from afar. By rendering ecological terrains relatable and governable at a dis-
tance, representations support projects of authority despite, or even through, absence.
In Southeast Angola, these projects downplay the knowledge generated through the
auto-presentation of the known. Furthermore, they relegate what I call partly repre-
sentable knowledge to a “lower” status, as inappropriate, if not dangerous.
Partly representable knowledge refers to knowledge that is mainly nonrepresent-
able and is necessarily based on physical proximity in which knowledge is coconstituted
with and in the presence of the knowable.14 It hinges on the knowables-in-themselves
and takes the form of intercorporeality. Therefore, here I wish to propose partly repre-
sentable knowledge (and even thinking) as a relational field of intersubjectivity between
knowers and the known.15
Of course, since these pages themselves represent, they cannot fully convey the
essence of such a knowledge. But, as Michael Carolan points out,16 this does not mean
that we cannot at least get a taste of it by talking and writing about its vestiges. More-
over, the prominent inhabitation and yet nonreferable character of the nonrepresent-
able in certain ways of knowing should not prevent us from considering its ethical
possibilities in promoting more integrative forms of politics. As Catriona Sandilands ob-
serves, “if the part of nature that is beyond language is to exert an influence on politics,
there must be a political recognition of the limits of language to represent nature, which
to me means the development of an ethical relation to the Real.”17 Ultimately, the story
that I tell here illuminates how the association of rationality, credibility, and ethics with
representations in exclusive, total terms reproduces and reinforces discriminatory divi-
sions: the knower and the known, Us and the Other, humans and nature, governors and
governed.
This article proceeds in four main sections: First I introduce a sequence of episodes
involving various people with regard to a forest located in Southeast Angola. This se-
quence epitomizes something broader that I became aware of during my fieldwork:
forests are an epistemic field that evidences contrasting modes of relating with the
known. In the second section, I explore the notion of forest knowledge as held by Ango-
lan officials as being informed by criteria of representation and distance. In contrast
with this, I then discuss alternative ways of knowing the forests, apprehended and
14. In contrast with “nonrepresentational knowledge” (for example, see Anderson and Harrison,“The
Promise of Non-representational Theories”; and Thrift, Non-representational Theory), the concept of partly repre-
sentable knowledge incorporates the possibility of representational agency in the process of knowing.
15. Inspired by Johannes Fabian’s “Ethnography and Intersubjectivity,” I take intersubjectivity as a condi-
tion of communication (either with or without the use of representations) that is coproductive of knowledge and
that precludes hierarchical relationships between those taking part in such coproduction (both humans and non-
humans).
16. Carolan, “More-than-Representational Knowledge/s of the Countryside,” 412.
17. Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist, 180.
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held through proximity, presence, and the partly representational. I concentrate on the
village of Cusseque. Finally, in the last section I continue with contrasts and counter-
point to the previous part with the analysis of the first international conference on for-
est management in Angola. The introduction of this event serves to show the rooting of
a delocalized expert authority in the country, which attempts to establish the legiti-
macy of its control over the forests through representational relations of distance to
them. Overall, I seek (1) to demonstrate how (in Angola, at least) representational eco-
logical knowledge is used to claim rule and occupancy without presence; (2) to show
that such rule and occupancy establish their legitimacy by preventing the represented
from presenting itself; and (3) to explore what makes exceeding the representable a
threat to legitimate ecological knowledge and rule. Ultimately, I discuss the virtues of
placing less (exclusive) emphasis on the use of representations in relational ethics and
knowledge formation.
Forests as Objects of Knowledge and Care
“Independent” Angola was born and grew up in conflict. After five centuries of Portu-
guese colonial domination, on November 11, 1975, the new country emerged. Subse-
quently, a civil war went on for twenty-seven years. Throughout this time, a portion of
Angola was referred to, in political and popular discourses, as the “land at the end of
the world.” The association of Southeast Angola with remoteness originated with early
Portuguese explorers, who, the Orientalist narrative goes, noted “the nativeness of the
local populations and the almost total preservation of the natural environment.”18
Yet in the last seven years or so, the image of Southeast Angola has changed, and
it is now referred to in national discourses as terras do progresso (a “land of progress”).
This radical shift is the effect of a public politics of national unification undertaken by
the Angolan government.19 Since 2011 I have conducted intermittent fieldwork in this
region—usually twice a year, now totaling approximately eleven months.20 I frequented
governmental, development, and academic departments mostly in the provinces of
Kuando Kubango, Bié, and Huambo. For the most part, however, I stayed in rural vil-
lages such as Liazemba and Cusseque, which are twenty kilometers apart. These two
villages, each having around 350 residents, mostly Tchokwe and fluent in Portuguese,
are located in valleys surrounded by a dense miombo forest. My regular back-and-forth
journeys between these villages and the cities of the institutionalized environmental
18. Diniz, Características Mesológicas de Angola, 455.
19. Baptista, “The Road of Progress.”
20. In 2011, I integrated a large research project dedicated to the countries of Angola, Botswana, and
Namibia. Crucial for this research program, which was largely conducted by natural scientists and economists,
was accountability—the capacity to show and explain the “research findings” and “objects of enquiry” to others
physically distant from those same findings and objects. Although I do not approach the intricacies of this project
here, this article is an obvious consequence of my epistemological struggles regarding the “accountable sci-
ence” of the project.
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experts introduced me to profound contrasts in the way ecological knowledge was con-
stituted and exercised. One of the most conspicuous contrasts pertained precisely to the
knowledge of the forest that encompasses both Liazemba and Cusseque. Consider the
following sequence.
In the early morning of May 8, 2013, I meet with the soba—village headman—of
Liazemba. I have known Soba Laurindo since 2011. Our conversations are long and usu-
ally peppered with assorted topics. Without being exuberant, Soba Laurindo has always
been an eloquent and unambiguous communicator to me. On the morning in question,
I tried to bring the subject of the surrounding forest into our conversation. He seemed
reluctant to engage with the topic, remaining silent, hesitant, or, at best, vague during
most of our conversation. Finally, after some twenty minutes of nervous silences he
said to me, in a conclusive tone, “You have to go [to the forest] and feel it yourself. Then,
you will know the forest.”
His reaction was not new to me. In my conversations with the villagers, most
women, men, elders, and young adults from Liazemba have always been vague regard-
ing the forest. Yet their experience with the forest is essential for making a living. Most
of their lives depend on and take shape in the context of the direct relations they estab-
lish with the various elements in the forest. However, when asked about it, and in the
innumerable informal gatherings and conversations that I participated in, residents
of Liazemba seemed to avoid any discussions about the forest, as if it was unknown
to them.
Various authors report the same in their ethnographies of forest areas. Eric Wad-
dell described the Enga people of New Guinea’s central highlands as “not, strictly speak-
ing, able to say” anything about their lived forests.21 Referring to research developed by
Bradley Walters on mangrove forests in the Philippines, Andrew Vayda, Bradley Walters,
and Indah Setyawati point out that most of what local residents do in the forests is non-
verbalized.22 Vayda argues that there is “little active knowledge-sharing” and therefore,
residents do not base their doings on “knowledge.”23 Implicitly, these scholars attribute
forest knowledge to something that must be able to be transferred and transacted by ver-
bal or textual communication. This is not a something of little importance, but the
something that João Coelho calls “the very flesh of thought.”24 Basically, they equate
forest knowledge with the ability to represent. From this perspective, the silences of
Soba Laurindo and his neighbors seem to indicate ignorance about the surrounding for-
est: as if silence necessarily implies an overall state of lack—in this case a lack of knowl-
edge. Yet this is a perspective that excludes knowledge of an “existence that refuses
to be conceptualized”25 or, as Levinas has noted, a reality that “reveals its existing in
21. Waddell, The Mound Builders, 136.
22. Vayda, Walters, and Setyawati, “Doing and Knowing.”
23. Vayda, Explaining Human Actions and Environmental Changes, 104.
24. Wieser, “‘A língua é a própria carne do pensamento,’” 163.
25. Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am, 9.
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dimensions that cannot be defined by any category of representation.”26 Some scholars
actually argue that “to speak of or for nonhuman nature is, to some extent, a misrepre-
sentation.”27 In this view, rather than ignorance about forests, silences can indicate dif-
ferent ways of knowing them, or simply nonparticipation in certain epistemologies.
Later in this article we shall return to Soba Laurindo to interpret the unsaid.
I had scheduled for the afternoon of the same day an interview with the director
and subdirector of the state Forest Department in Kuando Kubango Province. The meet-
ing was in the city of Menongue, 180 kilometers south of Liazemba. I asked them if they
knew of sustainable forest practices undertaken by the residents of Liazemba. After I
clarified with them the location of the village, the subdirector’s answer came promptly:
“The peasant doesn’t know anything about forests. In Liazemba and neighboring vil-
lages, they are illiterate and thus don’t care about the forest and other people besides
themselves. They don’t have how.”
The expression “don’t have how” (não tem como, in the original Portuguese) is com-
mon in Angola. It refers to individuals who do not possess the means or do not know
how to achieve something needed or aspired to. In the subdirector’s opinion, the resi-
dents of Liazemba (and neighboring villages) have no know-how about the forest
where they live. Moreover, he associated such a lack of know-how with their inability
to care about “other people besides themselves.” Inductively, the subdirector referred
to a chain of positive associations absent in Liazemba: he associated the competence to
know forests with literacy, which in turn he associated with the virtue of caring about
people in other places. Far from being unconventional, the linking of ways of knowl-
edge with distance in relationships of care pervades politico-ecological discourses in
Angola.28 In April 2011, for example, the director of the Angolan Planet Earth Committee
warned that what and how “Angolans know [about forests in Angola] has an impact on
other [people in other] countries . . . so Angolans should be aware of their moral respon-
sibility.”29 This public declaration, similar to many other statements made by an elite
group of urban governors, state technocrats, and development-science professionals in
Angola, comes equipped with a sense of morality associated with the delocalizing of
knowledge and governance of local forests. One crucial question emerges: what sort of
forest-ecological knowledges are deemed politically, developmentally, and ethically rel-
evant once local forests become declared as relevant to distant individuals and, further-
more, integrated into the field of delocalized care? And, more specifically, which sources
of knowledge and modes of knowing are valued in this process?
Later the same day I received a phone call from Luís Infelizmeno, an academic
researcher living in the city of Lubango, seven hundred kilometers west of Liazemba.
26. Levinas, quoted in Geissler, comment on “Anthropology through Levinas,” 265.
27. For example, see Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist, 180.
28. For the effect of knowledge generated at a distance on relationships of care, see Levinas, En découv-
rant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
29. ANGOP, “Comité Nacional do Planeta Terra deve servir de exemplo em África.”
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He was a doctoral candidate in environmental science with whom I had established
contact before. I asked him if he knew about the forest at Liazemba. “Yes, perfectly,”
Luís said, “I read about it. For everybody’s sake we have to hurry to solve the ruination
of the forest there with proper measures.” I asked him about his concerns. He advised
me, “Consult the maps and you’ll really know it. Check FAO’s numbers and the reports
of international NGOs, and you’ll know what is really happening with the forest there
now.” At that time, I was staying in Liazemba, near the forest that we discussed. Never-
theless, and despite his being aware of this, he told me that in order to “really know it” I
should rely exclusively on information contained in maps and documents produced
elsewhere about what was, at that time, physically close to me—a place in which I
could dwell.
The next morning I talked with a Spanish development professional working for
an international NGO in Kuito, 160 kilometers north of Liazemba. When I mentioned to
him the evasiveness Soba Laurindo showed during my conversation with him, the offi-
cial replied promptly: “The peasants don’t have access to the materials and reports
[necessary] to know the forests. They know only what they touch and see right in front
of their eyes. They don’t care and they think everything is fine. But it isn’t! The scientific
data confirm this. We must work for urgent solutions. This is an ethical matter that
touches us all.” Then, he alerted me to written works that had been produced by inter-
national scientists about forests in Angola. Although he often referred enthusiastically
to “traditional knowledge,” he downplayed the ability of the individuals to whom he
explicitly felt that concept applied to, local rural residents, to produce or possess reliable
forest knowledge in their own right.
Underpinning the development professional’s rationale was the assumption that
the environmental “risks of civilization today typically escape [direct] perception.”30
This view does not necessarily undervalue the commonsense everyday epistemology
that “seeing is believing,” or the Aristotelian association of sight with evidence. Rather,
it underestimates bodily proximity and haptic engagement as methods for knowing
properly.
Starting in Liazemba and ending at the international NGO in Kuito, I wish to high-
light a conspicuous issue characterizing the ecological-knowledge-based order in An-
gola: the emergent politics of discrediting and expert demarcation that promote modal-
ities of distant knowing. Crucially, these are modalities that gain an aura of rigor,
authority, and ethics from the dignifying of representations and their representers,
while underestimating that which is otherwise.
“Intellectualism”
After spending four weeks conducting research in the village of Cusseque, twenty
kilometers south of Liazemba, the state governor of the municipality of Chitembo,
30. Beck, Risk Society, 21.
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which encompasses both Cusseque and Liazemba, approached me at a food stand in
Chitembo’s market and told me: “For your studies, you should consult and speak with
the intellectuals instead, who of course are not in the village where you stay.” Intellec-
tuals, he clarified, are “those who can talk about things properly and know about
them.” Because of the myriad provincial authorizations and bureaucratic documents I
had delivered to his administration in advance he was aware of my research topic and
geographical focus. He knew that I was staying in that particular village at the time be-
cause I was investigating aspects related to the specific forest surrounding the village.
Yet he not only underestimated the contribution of the village residents to my research
but also undervalued the condition of my own prolonged presence in the locale as a
means of producing reliable knowledge about it. The governor, I learned during the
next months, was an advocate of distance in order to learn about there-ness; an advo-
cate of epistemologies of bodily separation.
In his study of media in eastern Germany, Dominic Boyer explores the opposition
between the human body and legitimate knowledge.31 He shows how expertise and
“intellectualism” are social phenomena associated with decorporealization. To support
his argument, Boyer cites Marxian social theory on the division of labor. In Marx and
Engels’s words, the “division of labor only becomes truly such from the moment when
a division of material and mental labor appears.”32 In this view, incorporeal mental
Arbeit—a German word that translates here as “labor”—is associated with reasoning
and ethics,33 while physical Arbeit is understood as a less intellectually and ethically
reliable activity. This distinction helps to contextualize the words of the governor of
Chitembo: trustworthy knowledge about the forest can only originate from intellectual
labor, which could imply the absenting of direct bodily interaction with the forest.
More in line with the historiography of the region, such a Cartesian division stems
from colonial ideas prevalent in the eighteenth century, which associated bodily sen-
sory experience with the “wild African.” In 1793, for example, Friedrich Schiller wrote
the famous Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man, in which he stresses, “As long as
man is still a savage, he enjoys by means of tactile senses.”34 In 1774, in The History of
Jamaica, Edward Long stated that Africans’ “hearing is remarkably quick; their faculties
of smell and taste are truly bestial.”35 Much earlier, in the sixteenth century, Portuguese
explorers reported that the Jaga people of the Kingdom of Kongo (which encompasses
contemporary Angola) were “wild beasts” who oriented themselves in the forests just by
listening to the sounds.36 These positions cultivated the divide between reason and sen-
suous corporeality, morality and immorality, the clean and the unclean, transcendence
31. Boyer, “The Corporeality of Expertise.”
32. Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 159.
33. Ibid.
34. Classen, “Foundations for an Anthropology of the Senses,” 405.
35. Long, The History of Jamaica, 383.
36. Lopez and Pigaffetta, Relação do reino do Congo e das terras circunvizinhas, 135.
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and animality respectively. They cultivated a model for the bestialization of certain
modes of knowing, being, and “presencing.”
Indeed, the conceptualization of the Other into an object incapable of rationally
knowing and dwelling in his or her place of inhabitation was crucial for the colonial
venture. It promoted the separation between the subjects who know, who are modern
and illuminated, and the objects that do not know, that are savage and thoughtless.
This separation, which was always reinforced by religion, science, and law, justified
colonial appropriation in rational (and “intellectual”) terms. In the colonial project, the
usurpation of distant geographies was not only fostered by a way of thinking about
race, but fundamentally linked with a way of thinking about what makes knowledge.
Back to present-day Angola. On one occasion, I gave a lift to a state administrator
of a regional commune in Chitembo municipality. We went to Mumbué, a town in Bié
province. At one point, after I stopped for a brief talk with a group of Cusseque resi-
dents, the administrator said, “You should forget these ignorant creatures.” I asked him
why. “They live surrounded by trees,” he explained. I replied, “So, they may not be igno-
rant in relation to the trees . . . ” Before I completed my sentence, he exclaimed, “No,
they are ignorant about trees because they live too close to them. They don’t know
about trees and forests. How could they? They don’t have access to anything about the
trees.” Besides reinforcing the burgeoning environmental rhetoric in Angola, which dis-
credits proximity in knowledge formation, he defended the importance of attending to
the “about”—the referential—more than its actual referent as crucial for knowing.
Both the governor of Chitembo and the administrator of the commune exhibited a
conviction that is pervasive in official discourses related to ecological decision making
in Angola: trust mainly in the virtues of distance and representation. Accordingly, in
2006 the Angolan Ministry of Urbanization and Environment published the MINUA
2006, an influential report on the country’s environment. The national and inter-
national authors advance their crucial instruction at the beginning of the 326-page doc-
ument: “It is strongly recommended that full priority be given only to . . . choices based
on facts and statistics.”37 Like other possible fountainheads of knowledge, “facts and
statistics” can be fruitful, of course. They can be effective in strengthening or support-
ing arguments and campaigns to raise awareness about important matters in vast
audiences—that is, to make global questions relevant locally or local questions relevant
globally. However, “facts and statistics” are born of something else, and those men-
tioned in MINUA 2016 originate mainly from methods involving distance.
One of these methods is explained in what has come to be one of the most
emblematic contemporary references on forest knowledge in Angola: the scientific arti-
cle “Spatial Dynamics and Quantification of Deforestation in the Central-Plateau Wood-
lands of Angola,” by Ana Cabral and colleagues. I was first introduced to this work by an
37. Governo de Angola, Programa de Investimento Ambiental. Relatório do Estado Geral do Ambiente em
Angola—MINUA 2016, vii.
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Italian from an international NGO operating in Lubango. “This text is the leading source
for the proper knowledge and administration of forests in Angola,” he said. The Portu-
guese authors of this influential publication state that satellite imagery is the best source
of information for knowing and managing the forests in Angola.38 They base their claim
on the analysis of “Landsat satellites images” of the Angolan province of Huambo,
which they obtained from US institutions. These images, generated and worked on
thousands of kilometers away from what they represent, have a spatial resolution of
thirty meters—meaning that one pixel corresponds to nine hundred square meters on
the ground. The authors mention briefly the use of “ancillary data” for substantiating
their conclusions. These were colonial phytogeographic maps, Google Earth imagery,
and reports of several visits to less than 1 percent of the area analyzed. They call the
latter “ground truth points”—products of encounters with fragments that nonetheless
serve to validate the knowledge of the whole. While this knowing method alone can be
useful for dealing with surfaces, it does not apprehend—and, therefore, leaves out—a
world of details and circumstances, “ground truths” of 99 percent of the area, to use the
authors’ terminology, that is also important in order to know the forests. Moreover, it
disregards the capacity of the known itself in its actual condition, prior to representa-
tion, to present itself.
Fundamentally, such confidence in the distant above for knowing and managing
derives from placing the referential (the “about”)—in particular, the visualized—into
the field of total knowing. Christian Metz calls this the “scopic regime” and points out
the paradoxical source of its credibility: “the absence of the object” known.39 Indeed, we
are dealing here with a knowledge framework that achieves legitimacy through a para-
dox: the separation between knowledge and its objects.
The interpretation of geospatial imagery as “evidentiary protocol” has become
doctrine in the politico-ecological field in Angola, particularly since the end of the civil
war in 2002.40 This was the time when the country started opening its doors more inten-
tionally to international development-scientific actors. For example, in 2005, the Ango-
lan government invited the United States Forest Service (USFS) to study the forests
in Kuando Kubango. The goal was to develop accurate knowledge of the forests in order
to produce a management plan.41 All technical meetings were held in Luanda, around
one thousand kilometers from the actual object of knowledge and management. The
knowledge-data produced by USFS derived from observation flights over the forests by
the international experts.42 The USFS team came down once to one forest and made
brief visits to the villages of Caiundo and Dumbu. These visits, the experts’ report di-
vulges, “revealed the ignorance of the local populations in regard to . . . fundamental
38. Cabral, Vasconcelos, Oom, and Sardinha, “Spatial Dynamics,” 1185.
39. Metz, The Imaginary Signifier, 6.
40. For “evolutionary protocol,” see Engelke, “The Objects of Evidence,” 51.
41. Zweede, Safford, and Juergens, “Serviço Florestal do USDA,” 7.
42. Ibid., 10.
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knowledge of the identity and nature of their surrounding forests.”43 Finally, the USFS
team recommended the acquisition of Landsat satellite imagery and the regular use of
remote sensing technology by the national experts (in urban areas) to produce the
knowledge required for the rational management of the forests in Kuando Kubango.
The point I wish to stress here is that in the modern politics of ecology in and of
Angola, that which is made visible from above, and thus rendered representable, is rei-
fied and then worshipped. In this process, reliable forest knowledge and forest manage-
ment are made possible through, not just with, representations being produced, handled,
and re-presented away from the forests. Such representations are not merely employed
in order to credibly reveal the reality of the forests. They have become indispensable to
making and acquiring that reality.
Another Art of Learning: Forests beyond Representation
The forest encircling the villages of Liazemba and Cusseque is one of the contemporary
targets of “datafication” at a distance by international development-scientific projects.
Among other initiatives, at the beginning of 2012, a German PhD student of biology at
the University of Hamburg traveled to Cusseque to install various data loggers. He in-
formed me by e-mail that the devices “will stay out there the whole year, to understand
climatic conditions, vegetation growth, etc.” They were retrieved in 2013 and brought
back to Germany. The data loggers carried “data of the forest that is precious for environ-
mental policy-making in the region,” as a climate scientist from the Helmholtz-Zentrum
Geesthacht, who had never visited the forest in question—or even Angola—told me at a
conference in Hannover. “What about the knowledge that people who live in Cusseque
have about their surrounding forest?” I asked him. “They must know it, of course. But
they don’t have the precision about the forest that is needed. They lack a detached
point of view,” he explained. In his view, Cusseque residents’ knowledge about their
place of living was irrelevant for two reasons: they lack the means of “precision” to
know and they know the forest in direct (“attached”) relation with it. These arguments
are not new. As I mentioned before, they justified and validated colonial occupation in
Africa.
In March 2011 I began an uninterrupted stay of two months in exactly that
village—Cusseque. When I first contacted the population, I asked the long-term resi-
dents to assist me in creating a collaborative map that would display their knowledges
and values pertaining to the surrounding forest. Although most of the residents were
enthusiastic about it, I faced a methodological impasse. Most of the residents were un-
able to represent their knowledge and values through cartography or in any other
form.44 Alternatively, people I talked to frequently invited me to accompany them to
visit the things in the forest they knew and valued most.
43. Ibid., 14.
44. Baptista, “‘Everything,’” 400.
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On one of these walks, I was led to the local cemetery—an area absorbed by the
forest. I was unfamiliar with the place. I questioned José Buengue about the value of
the cemetery for him and why it was more densely populated with trees than the sur-
rounding forest. This was a place of human death filled with nonhuman life. Without
obtaining a direct reply, I continued with other questions about the forest. At one point,
José stooped, put his right hand on a tree, slowly inhaled through his nostrils, and said
to me, “Just listen to this smell.” In that tree, there was a hole a few meters above our
heads where hundreds of bees produced what residents refer to and value as “wild
honey.” Surprisingly for me, I was only able to realize this by putting my hand on the
tree, as if the inconspicuous vibration of the trunk, which could only be felt by pro-
longed touch, activated my capacity to hear and recognize the buzzing sound of the
bees and the smell of the honey.
This episode echoes something common for local residents: the way knowledge of
the forest components are created, updated, and revised comes fundamentally from the
known-in-itself and from the overlapping of the senses. Direct touch, hearing, smell,
sight, taste—most often simultaneously—are all relevant sources of knowledge, as if to
know the forest implies, before anything else, unmediated “multisensing,” or, as phe-
nomenologists would call it, a prelinguistic ability in situ. Moreover, the touch-smell of
the honey taught me something about the place, which I do not know how to repro-
duce. I underwent what Anna Tsing realized herself in her ethnography in the Oregon
forests: “We don’t know how to put much about smell into words,”45 and even, I would
add, into any other form of representation. Basically, José introduced me to the evoca-
tive power of the feeling of direct experience—a bone-sensorial signaling experience—
to know the forest. A feeling that reaches beyond the representable.
“Feeling,” Tim Ingold says, is beyond “making bodily contact.” It is a kind of inter-
penetration of the self and its surroundings. In the context at stake here, it is a way the
forest has of “invading” the perceiver and the perceiver’s way of “meeting this inva-
sion.”46 Feeling does indeed do something: among other possibilities, it may lead the
person to ascribe meaning to the felt, which may remain unspeakable. And this, I de-
fend, should not be treated as something that does not qualify as valuable knowledge.
To consider immediate feeling an important means of knowledge implies going beyond
the dominant paradigm of “knowing about” and to emphasize “knowing with”—knowing
with the known.
Accordingly, José brought me into a moment where I learned about the forest with
the forest. While sensing and learning with the tree, I felt free from the impulse to objec-
tify the essence of the knowledge that I apprehended, which corroborates Ingold’s argu-
ment: “Where ‘of-ness’ makes the other to which one attends into its object . . . ‘with-
ness’ saves the other from objectification.”47 This means that the knowledge I acquired
45. Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World, 46.
46. Ingold, “Earth, Sky, Wind, and Weather,” 29.
47. Ingold, “On Human Correspondence,” 19–20.
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there and then was not cognitive but “ecological.”48 At the heart of this learning prac-
tice, characterized by letting things reveal themselves beyond classifications, is the
principle that unfeigned ecological knowledge can originate only in what Levinas called
the “face-to-face.”49
For Levinas, meaningful knowledge relies on lived immediacy and the noninterfer-
ence of representational agency, which in his view withdraws the subjects represented
from their beingness.50 In his words, “The face that looks at me introduces the primary
frankness of revelation.”51 In contrast to Heidegger, who advocated for the virtue of dis-
tance in moral reasoning,52 Levinas argued that moral forms of knowledge can only
emerge from “the presence of being in the phenomenon.”53 He provides a basis for ques-
tioning the ethic of knowing that relies, largely, on objectifying environmental subjects
through distanciation.54 The experience of proximity, Levinas said, offers “the first intel-
ligible,” the first rationality. Moreover, for Levinas, proximity is at the core of ethical
relations insofar as it can lead to a more honest interpretation of the other (human or,
I add, otherwise). Levinas’s considerations inform the answer to a vital question: what
forms and sources of knowing allow ecological knowables to more effectively become
participants in the formation of knowledge about them, and, therefore, are deemed
more integrative?
As in many other “collectives” (if not in all, to some degree), in Cusseque, peo-
ple engage the sensorial and relational capacity of their bodies not only to apprehend,
make sense, and learn about the physical phenomena surrounding them but also to
value such phenomena. Knowledge, value, and meaning are embedded in the everyday
relational field. It is through direct relations with and in the forest that some local resi-
dents know and value outside the nameable condition more than forty different tree
species, many of which were understood by most of the political and development pro-
fessionals working in the forest sector who I met in Angola as undistinguished orna-
mental trees. Knowledge beyond characterization expands the field of the knowable. In
Cusseque, this lets each species count as a form of life with some specificity. This is evi-
dent when, for example, local residents resort to different tree species for different pur-
poses and occasions. It is by relating directly with things regardless of whether they can
be understood through representations that the residents know many other life forms
48. Ibid., 20.
49. Levinas, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
50. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 98. See also, Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.
51. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 98.
52. Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 221.
53. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 100.
54. In his humanist philosophy, Levinas excludes the nonhuman. For him, the face of the other, which is
the only gateway to understanding this other, is always the face of a human being. However, I extend his argu-
ments beyond human exceptionalism and I apply them to humans’ relationships with other organic and in-
organic subjects.
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and abiotic components in the forest, such as different soils, roots, animals, fruits, in-
sects, rocks, levels of humidity, fungi, and so forth.55 Ultimately, what these residents
make of the surrounding forest is inseparable from both the potency of the forest’s ac-
tual presence and their prolonged, face-to-face, sensorial engagement with it: the cor-
porally lived confluence with the known.
In Cusseque, various women have died after introducing the peeled roots of the
muchacha tree into their vaginas. This was explained to me as part of a broader impulse:
when some men and women are exasperated with something, someone, or a situation
that they feel impotent to deal with, in an uncontrollable moment of fury, they molest
themselves with whatever they have at hand. Unexpectedly, some of these self-injuring
acts had tragic consequences. The ways that the muchacha tree, and, specifically, the
acute toxicity of methyl salicylate found in the roots of this tree species, become
known in the village sheds light on a further issue: residents’ knowledge of the compo-
nents of the forest, as well as the possibilities and consequences that engaging with
them might entail, are intertwined with moments in which the forest’s components
disclose themselves to the residents. This adds a new dimension to what proponents of
nonrepresentational theories and forms of knowing have stressed: as Ben Anderson
and Paul Harrison highlight, “They share an approach to meaning and value as ‘though-
in-action.’”56 In Cusseque, however, forest knowledge does not just derive from actions
and experiences of unrepresentability with the known, but also, and essentially, does
so from “the possibility of an autopresentation of things”57—from letting them be. This
openness to the known-in-itself echoes a trait of “shamanic knowledge”—as explained
by Viveiros de Castro—since it also takes on the inherent capacities of that which must
be known.58 In this process, both the knower and the known are causal beings for each
other. This means that signification is coproduced through immediate relationships. As
Levinas would say, these are relationships of knowledge that do not conceptualize.59
“You don’t learn how to make a cure just by listening or writing it down,” a thirty-
eight-year-old woman from Cusseque warned me after I asked her about local medicinal
practices. “You have to go with me to the forest and get the things yourself. And then,
you cook them with your own hands.” Her call for personal involvement with the sub-
ject in question in order to know it urges incorporation and openness to subjects and
occurrences without the imperative of rendering them translatable through words, bod-
ily gestures, or materials. It is a call to immerse oneself in a process of intertwinement
between the sensing body and the surrounding world, which eludes any epistemology
55. To read more on the uses and ways of valuing the forest by the local residents, see Baptista, “Every-
thing.”
56. Anderson and Harrison, “The Promise of Non-representational Theories,” 6.
57. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 90. Emphasis added.
58. Viveiros de Castro, “Exchanging Perspectives,” 468.
59. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 48.
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that focuses exclusively on models of distancing and representation. What is at stake
here is a partly representable knowing.
In Cusseque, the forest is more than merely the stage on which local residents
fight for epistemological and material domination; it is a determinant by which both hu-
mans and nonhumans are coconstituted—a field of becoming-with. This is why I was
often told things like, “The forest taught me to be a man,” “It is the forest that helps me
to resist life,” and “That tree doesn’t like me.” These are not just metaphorical expres-
sions but the consequences of a relational phenomenon, in which only face-to-face
relations in and with the forest can lend the necessary qualities for knowing it. Here,
both forest knowledge and self-cultivation emerge from long-standing experiences of
closeness, experiences that compel a knowing not only of the forest but of one’s self. In
this way, rather than as a compound of photographs, nomenclatures, maps, and other
representations produced over space and time, the forest has a potency of affect (in
knowledge or otherwise) as an assemblage of agentic tutors, companions, and un-
friendly entities that are accessible only through experience in the place.
To return to my conversation with Soba Laurindo in Liazemba, his prolonged
pauses and hesitation when challenged by my questions about the forest did not indi-
cate ignorance of or, even less, unfamiliarity with it. Rather, they revealed his unwilling-
ness to employ words, concepts, and other communicative representations with which
he could express his knowledge about it to me. Words and concepts allow us to grasp
realities. But they also imply the specific rules and, more broadly, the governing ratio-
nalities relevant to forming and accepting such realities. Implicit in these rationalities
is that speaking about, and thus in the place of, the known, implies that the known must
first be, even if momentarily, converted into a quiet, passive, nonagentic object, which
then can be made comprehensible through familiar forms of communication. Basically,
Soba Laurindo did not resort to the rules implied in any common form of representa-
tional conversion to demonstrate what he knew through lived intercorporeality. This is
a knowledge not concerned with the imposition of truth on others—a knowledge that
“goes without saying,” generated and signified by a partly representable actuality of that
which is felt through unmediated relationships and by somatic sensuousness. This is
why Soba Laurindo suggested that I engage with the subject of my enquiries in the same
way: “You have to go [to the forest] and feel it yourself. Then you will know the forest.”
Ecoauthority: Knowledge, Management, and Representing Relations
In May 2013 I attended a two-day conference in Huambo, which during colonial times
carried the reputation as Angola’s academic capital. I was constantly reminded that
this was the first international conference on forest management in Angola (Conferência
Internacional Protecção e Manejo das Florestas Angolanas, in the original Portuguese).
There were six panels; seventeen academic and development professionals from more
than eight countries and four continents presented and discussed their findings per-
taining to forests and deforestation in the country. No forest inhabitants participated in
412 Environmental Humanities 10:2 / November 2018
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/environmental-humanities/article-pdf/10/2/397/555852/397baptista.pdf
by joao.afonso.baptista@gmail.com
on 05 December 2018
the conference. It was an event of group distinction that, with the passage of time, mu-
tated into a “ceremony” performed to crown an elite.
At this “ceremony,” the definition of forest was one of the key topics. “We should
start by discussing what forests are,” said one of the conveners of the opening ceremony.
Her point was relevant. H. Gyde Lund, a consultant for the United States Department of
Agriculture, found over sixteen hundred different definitions for forest in institutional,
scholarly, and web-based contemporary publications.60 Since its first use in the late thir-
teenth century to refer to uncultivated land belonging to the crowns in European king-
doms, especially that used for royal hunts, the term has become diluted and has as-
sumed diverse meanings. At the conference, there were no illusions of creating a radical
new definition of forest. The challenge was, rather, deciding which of the existing defini-
tions to adopt. Those discussed differed only in terms of numerical limits, and they re-
volved around tree variables: area covered, tree crown covered, and tree size. According
to the latest Clean Development Mechanism, a part of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, a forest is an area of more than half a hectare with a
minimum tree crown cover of 10 percent of the total area. Furthermore, a tree is defined
as a plant capable of growing more than two meters tall.61 At the Huambo meeting,
these were the references considered for defining and making sense of the Angolan for-
ests and their levels of deforestation.
This approach, however, is controversial. Nophea Sasaki and Francis Putz, for
example, warn that “by setting the lower limit of tree crown cover at 10% or even 30%,
degradation leading to substantial reductions in standing stocks of carbon will be al-
lowed to continue without causing deforestation.”62 In other words, the parameters re-
ferred to at the conference and officially adopted in many other countries enable areas
with few trees to still be formally considered forests. Therefore, by adopting these broad
figures, governments and institutions authorize deforestation to occur without recog-
nizing it as such. This is still more paradoxical when the task of stopping environmental
degradation is politically, scientifically, and ethically declared by these same govern-
ments and institutions as more vital now than ever. Why do international organizations
wearing the hat of environmental concern, and national and transnational govern-
ments, create and adopt such parameters?
The reply: because such broad parameters allow forestland to be handled from afar.
In short, these canopy cover measurements have been established because they can be
monitored using remote sensing techniques.63 What happens apart from and undetected
under such (pixelated) parameters is not apprehendable from afar. It is unworkable and
ungovernable at a distance. Therefore, it is an existence unrecognized. In practice, this
60. Lund, “Definitions of Forest.”
61. UNFCCC, “Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session.”
62. Sasaki and Putz, “Critical Need for New Definitions of ‘Forest,’” 227.
63. Ibid., 227.
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means that the forest becomes captive to a rule of appearances (mostly grasped from
above) within which it is ordered and incorporated into the domain of the known and,
in turn, made manageable. At the heart of this rendering is the production of certain
kinds of ecological existence and the derailing of others—the reliable real becomes that
which is attained remotely. Along with this “economy of the Real” come the geopolitical
exaltation and legitimation of the type of knowledge (and knowers) that better mobilize
and make accessible absent or distant phenomena.64
One of the obvious problems arising from forest knowledge being produced mainly
through distant analysis is that forests and deforestation gain more relevance as mobi-
lizing representable ideas than as actual, physically felt phenomena. “Representations,”
Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan stresses, “are intimately connected to . . . policy
instruments.”65 They validate and urge interventions. Indeed, what makes representa-
tions so sought after is that they not only allow the organization of the known in one’s
consciousness, but also, because representations can be externalized and circulated be-
yond oneself, they allow the dissemination of that organization in others. Representa-
tional knowledge can, thus, promote the understanding of things and peoples while plac-
ing these same things and peoples under the domain of those who represent them.
Levinas called this the “mythic knowledge,” a mode of knowing that names and classi-
fies objects in order to appropriate them. This means that acts of representing may be
implicated in acts of authority, differentiation, and discrimination. Take the following
example.
At the Huambo conference, the seventh presenter introduced the audience to a
forest management project that the Portuguese NGO Marquês de Valle Flôr was admin-
istrating in a few villages in the municipality of Ekunha, in Angola. At one point, after
supporting his arguments with satellite pictures, he referred to the time limit for the
NGO project. But then he reassured the group: “We have been in contact with the NGO
ADRA and the state-led IDF so that they can assume the management of this forest
after we leave.” Both institutions are located in the city of Huambo, around one hundred
kilometers from the forest villages in Ekunha. At the end, I asked him why the local
populations were not considered to manage the forest. “We know how impossible it is
for them to manage the forest properly because they simply don’t have the knowledge
capacity [of the forest] for that,” he replied. The main coordinator of the NGO project,
who works in Portugal, was in the audience. She made herself known, and offered,
“Maybe I can add more information.” She proceeded to explain how this project was in-
terlinked with other funded forest projects that the Portuguese NGO was administering
in Mozambique: “The data from these projects [in Angola and Mozambique] are com-
pared and categorized in other countries. This is so that the management of the local
forests can benefit from the knowledge capacities of international experts.” As she
64. For “Economy of the Real,” see Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 277.
65. Sivaramakrishnan, “State Sciences and Development Histories,” 69.
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explained later, these were “experts” like the climate scientist from the Helmholtz-
Zentrum Geesthacht who had never visited forests in either Angola and Mozambique.
Note that the knowledge capacities and, associated with this, the credibility of the “ex-
perts” are not justified in spite of their being separate from their object of knowledge,
but because of such a separation. After all, it is because of this separation that the
knowledge of the Ekunha forest can circulate to, be “datafied” for, and studied by those
living apart from that forest. The NGO coordinator concluded, “This is the most accurate
and ethical manner to deal with our forests.” Here, representations and distance are not
just instruments for knowing the forests, but the means of relating with them in such a
way as to appropriate them ethically.
This pioneering event was important in cultivating Angolan forests beyond their
physical limits, by converting them into critical objects amenable to global comparison.
In the wake of the perils and benefits of global interconnectedness, this event certainly
served as a promising strategy of inclusion: to include Angolan forests in the map of
global awareness. Yet this was also a meeting of elite demarcation, one which reinforced
a hierarchy in knowledge formation. It illuminated how making forest knowledge a mat-
ter of specific expertise can be associated with the expansion of geoscientific rule. This
expansion is mostly carried out by a professional elite who are not physically present
in the actual terrains of their expert knowledge—an expansion that detracts from the
value of immediate cohabitation between knower and his or her object of knowledge,
and therefore undervalues Levinas’s face-to-face condition. In this process, distance is
transformed into a source of legitimacy and power, and representations become crucial
since for something that is absent or distant to be dealt with, it must first be brought
into appearance. Ultimately, this means the outsourcing and “denaturalization” of for-
ests. Here, I have in mind the famous Aristotelian conception of nature as having a
principle and cause to which it belongs primarily, by itself; that is, as something that
does not come to be through means other than its own condition.
Historically, since the rise of postindustrial societies, expert knowledge has be-
come a principal locus of interest for practices of appropriation. It is entangled with
mechanisms of power and the confiscation of gainful fields. This explains why, in An-
gola, the rendering inappropriate of forest dwellers’ knowledge and their ways of know-
ing is a way of deauthorizing them while empowering distant others over the physical
terrains of their everyday living.
By summarizing all the presentations and debates that followed them, the meeting
in Huambo illuminated the emergence of an elite authority in the country: an authority
founded on the transformation of forests into the property of an “intellectualism” devoid
of corporeally immediate relationships with its object of knowledge; an authority that
does not just rely on distance but that also produces it—distance from the known and
also distance to the “others.” Arguably, “clumsy” proposals were absent from this con-
vention. As Steve Rayner explains, solutions—and, I would add, proposals—are “clumsy”
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when theyarebasedon “multiple, diverse, perhaps incompatible, perspectives . . . resulting
in a settlement that is inelegant from any single perspective, but robust because it relies
on more than one epistemological and ethical foundation.”66 Indeed, openness to “alter-
native” possibilities was not a feature of this conference; and so, that which is unnotice-
able through representational endeavor remained unnoticed, or rather productively
ignored.
Conclusion
In December 2014, after several weeks of staying in Cusseque and Liazemba, I went to
Huambo, which, I was told often, has the biggest concentration of forest experts in
Angola. I went there to meet with national and international specialists on the forest
where I had been staying, three hundred kilometers south of the city. After two days
in Huambo, my left eye became inflamed. It was episcleritis, a Cuban doctor told me.
“Don’t worry,” he said, “this is very common here because of the car pollution.” My abil-
ity to see was severely diminished for weeks. Due to the absence of shade-providing
trees in the city, my skin was quickly burned and scarred by the intense sunlight. I be-
came less prone to feeling the world around me through touch. In reaction to the air
conditioners in the offices and cars of the forest experts, my nose was frequently con-
gested. Consequently, my capacity for olfactory discernment was weakened. So there I
was, in the place of the forest expert elite, an area of pollution naked of trees, depress-
ing my innate senses while improving my capacities for representational relations with
the known located elsewhere “out there”: a paradox, I felt, that threatened my own
health. The preponderance of ecological knowledge by way of distancing and senseless
presence in the ecologies known, I thought then, and continue to believe, is not only a
question of precision but also a question of an ethic of coexistence too—to know exclu-
sively from afar is to conceive of a world as separate and outside oneself. Ways of know-
ing may, indeed, carry ethical qualities. As Ingold says, “Something . . . must be
wrong . . . if the only way to understand our own creative involvement in the world is
by taking ourselves out of it.”67
The institutionalization of representational knowledge as a primordial method of
legitimation creates the opportunity to place ecological authority in the hands of a delo-
calized expertise, a major attribute of which is to identify the object of its knowledge
through a process of disempowering it; that is, in being abstracted from its mundane,
immediate relational significance, the knowable loses any possible competence that it
might have to partake in the production of the knowledge of itself. Therefore, the
ascension of the “expert-representers” in the Angolan forest sector parallels a process
by which the very object of their knowledge is disempowered, while representations be-
come the exclusive basis of their legitimacy.
66. Rayner, “Uncomfortable Knowledge,” 123.
67. Ingold, “Building, Dwelling, Living,” 58.
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In contrast, to overcome the sovereignty of representations as a means of knowing
forests requires both an increased emphasis on everyday, immediate cohabitation
with(in) the forests, and to open the knowledge of the forests to the forests themselves;
to knowing the forests through the forests.68 It implies associating knowledge with the
domain of the known, rather than solely with the domain of the knower—knowledge in
partly representable understandings is born and develops in the presence of the known
itself and, therefore, is meaningful for the relationships happening there. Thus I am
calling attention to the potency of location and everyday presence in ecological knowl-
edge. This, however, makes partly representable knowledge incompatible with neocolo-
nial strategies of expansion since it cannot support and legitimize the appropriation of
spaces and subjects at a distance or, more specifically, from far above.69 Indeed, partly
representable knowledge is ineffective as a tool of (eco)logics of far-reaching authority
and administration. This, I contend, is why such a form of knowledge becomes so mark-
edly a field of discredit and demoralization in Angola’s forest ecological sector. Without
the representational categories that the scientific-development expertise produces, it
would be much more problematic, in ethical terms, to wrest the forests from those who
live directly with them.
To conclude, I do not attempt to criticize the virtue of representations in universal
science and in knowledge in general. And I do not want to undermine or generalize my
arguments to the so-called forestry discipline.70 Rather, I wish to highlight the kinds of
hubris, ethics, and politics of division that the overemphasis on solely representational
relationships may support. Characteristic of this division is the separation between rep-
resenters and the represented, “knowers” and “ignorants,” “caring experts” and “care-
less locals,” respectively. This division may revive colonial procedures and is crucial for
the contemporary legitimation of power in the ecological field. Concretely, in Angola,
the marginalization of forest dwellers through the use of scientific-development knowl-
edge does not occur just because of the difference of representations or the overuse of
the body or the senses for knowing, as is commonly mentioned in the literature on
“indigenous knowledge.”71 Rather, their exclusion occurs because of the discrediting of
the inexpressible and the known in itself. Finally, in Angola the way the scientific-
development elite is conquering and arrogating spaces and subjects to itself demon-
strates how the glorification of distant forms of representational knowledge affects not
only what comes to count as truth, but also what counts as ethical.
68. See Kohn, How Forests Think.
69. See Scott, Seeing like a State (esp. chap. 1), in which he critically explores the “imperialism of the high-
modernist” ordering of forests. “At the limit,” Scott notes, “the forest itself would not even have to be seen; it
could be ‘read’ accurately from the tables and maps in the forester’s office” (15).
70. See, for example, Mathews, Instituting Nature. Note that this is actually the first time that I employ the
term forestry. Analyzing this scientific field is beyond the scope of this article.
71. Here I include counter-hegemonic fields such as “indigenous technical knowledge,” “ethnoscience,”
“ethnoclassificatory systems,” “native categories,” and “ethno-forestry.”
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